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Although the goals of the country’s energy transition (Energiewende) are widely accepted in Germany, the specific
route to get there is itself a matter of great controversy. The individual measures that are part of the energy transition
policy and the questions of how they interact and how they are embedded in the European context are objects of
controversial scientific and public debate. Most recently, the consequences for the price of electricity have, in particular,
been discussed intensely. Against this backdrop of wide-ranging criticism, the future course for promoting renewable
energy will soon be set. The German Renewable Energy Sources Act (the Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz, EEG), which is
the main instrument of energy transition policy with its feed-in tariffs, is supposed to be fundamentally revised in the
course of this year. A precondition for achieving a coherent further development of the energy transition policy and for
receiving the sound support of a critical public is that the long-term consequences of political decisions on a complex
sociotechnical energy system be taken into account. The requirements of such a system are not satisfied by policy
approaches or recommendations that target short-term effects or that are perceptions of problems extrapolated from
individual sectors. On the basis of its integrated research on the energy transition, researchers from the Helmholtz
Alliance Energy-Trans take a stand on current important controversial issues from the energy transformation and
specify fundamental challenges to shaping a sustainable energy transition policy.
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Feed-in tariff; Federalism; Energy policy; Market designThe energy transition: a long-term project and a
challenge to the system
The energy transition in Germany is nothing less than
the restructuring of the entire energy supply in the
sectors’ electricity, heat, and transportation in a highly
industrialized country. This comprehensive reorganization
is a task for generations, and yet the fundamental frame-
work has to be created today. Although there continues to
be a high level of approval in the general public [1–4] and
among all political forces [5], essential components of the
German energy transition policy are themselves currently
being subject to criticism, some of it very intense. The
focus of this criticism is most frequently on the renewable
energy supports provided for the generation of electricity,
which take the form of feed-in tariffs permitted by the
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in any medium, provided the original work is pGesetz (EEG)).a Challenges to the energy transition go,
however, far beyond this. What is required is a long-term
process of transforming a complex sociotechnical system
[6,7] in which the goal is to set the course of change so
that tomorrow’s energy supply works, its consumption of
resources, and its impact on the environment are limited
to a sustainable level, and, in the process, efficiency and
social acceptance are safeguarded. Political activity should
always keep this long-term systemic perspective in sight.
Policy that is directed toward short-term, purely sectoral
based indicators, such as the allocation of costs in the
EEG (the levy or surcharge), does not do this justice [8,9].Energy transition policy under scrutiny
A complex and sweeping enterprise such as the energy
transformation project must nonetheless - and quite
rightly - justify to a critical public that the overall policy
framework for such substantial structural changes is
correctly set and confirm that unnecessary costs are not
being imposed on the national economy. Agreement onn Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons
g/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction
roperly credited.
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beginning of reforms [8]. The instruments for the sub-
sequent implementation should be continuously adapted
in accordance with a process-based control strategy that is
open for corrections [10,11], since it is impossible today
to foresee every future challenge and necessary measure.
For this reason, the review that is currently underway,
particularly of the EEG, is in principle to be welcomed.
Regular corrections and realignments are inevitable if
new but suboptimal routes of development are to be
prevented from becoming stabilized and rigid.
The cost of the renewable energy expansion: an
objective debate is essential
The debate over reforms that has started in the mean-
time is falling short. It is strongly focused on the power
sector, the current consumer prices, and the influence of
the EEG levy on these prices. This reductionism blocks
our view both for the socioeconomic connections and
for the real challenges to energy policy. The heat and
transportation sectors are also central to a sustainable
transformation of our energy system, not just the power
supply [12].b From the perspective of the national econ-
omy, the costs that are at issue cannot be limited to
those printed right on the electricity bill. Other external
costs - in addition to CO2, there are also local environ-
mental issues - as well as special benefit dimensions,
such as learning curve effects of technology development,
also have to be taken into consideration [10,13–15]. Fur-
thermore, to be fair, every form of subsidy for an energy
carrier has to be taken into consideration, even those via
financing channels other than the price of electricity [16].
The current debate about the price of electricity does not
take all of this into account and turns our attention for
day-to-day political matters to issues that are not at the
heart of the challenges facing the transformation. Against
this backdrop, it is clear that a more objective debate
about costs is urgently necessary, as is a reorientation of
the reform agenda.
Support for renewables still sensible
There are still good reasons to continue a policy of sup-
porting renewable energy, at least in principle. Neither
have we come even remotely close to reaching our
ambitious goals for expanding it, nor do the current
market prices cover the relevant costs to the national
economy, which would represent the possibility for the
market alone to maintain undistorted, fair technological
competition to determine the most favorable manner of
generating energy [13,15,17]. The additional costs for
renewable energy, i.e., those beyond the price achieved
on the power exchange, will drop again considerably
anyway. The exchange prices, which in the medium
term will be oriented on the long-term marginal costsof the conventional power plants still producing electri-
city - and which will rise again after the excess capacity
is disposed of - contribute to this. Likewise, a more
robust European Union (EU) emissions trading system
would have a corrective effect on the distorted exchange
prices. For these reasons (incomplete internalization of
external effects, subsidies for conventional power gen-
eration, electricity prices on the exchange that are too
low) and because of the neglect of the future price
development, renewable energy continues to exhibit
strategic disadvantages in the public’s perception of costs
and in a comparison of market prices with conventional
energy carriers, which says nothing about their actual
long-term competitiveness [18]. In this respect, the sup-
port for renewables is currently not up for disposal, but it
is up for renewed goal-oriented development. This has to
be undertaken with due regard for the possible effects of
distortions of support policies for renewables [19]. Conse-
quently, it must be ensured that the goal is achieved in a
more cost-efficient manner, not just an effective one [20].
Keeping an eye on the social distribution of costs
The discussion of the costs and utility of the energy
transformation for society cannot be restricted to their
appropriate amounts. Their distribution to individuals,
groups, and regions belongs to the challenges facing
responsible policy making. In particular, the distribution
of the burden resulting from the energy transformation
may not be intransparent or in contradiction to the funda-
mental values of fairness. Above all, the extensive and
sometimes objectively groundless number of exceptions
for industry from the financing of the expansion of renew-
able energy by all the consumers of electricity meets with
substantial misgivings [21,22] and has become the object
of European proceedings for inappropriate state aid (see
the following section) [23]. The EEG-levy exceptions for
industryc have been repeatedly expanded in the past. They
should - independent of the requirements of European
law - rapidly be limited to a realistically tenable amount
that is aligned on the proven dangers to international
or intermodal competitiveness [21,22,24]. A company’s
energy consumption, the measure currently used by the
EEG, is an unsuitable indicator for this purpose.
Conformity of the EEG with European state aid
regulations
A current object of scrutiny with regard to European
regulations is the preferential treatment provided for by
the EEG. The prohibition of state aid forbids the use of
state funds to provide preferential treatment to certain
enterprises or branches regardless of their nature if it dis-
torts competition in Europe’s internal market or threatens
to do so (Article 107(1), Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union (TFEU)). This leads to requirements for
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Court of Justice (ECJ), however, decided in 2001 that
the law regulating the feed in of electricity of that time
conformed to EU state aid regulations because it did
not constitute state aid. This law obliged energy supply
companies and network operators to purchase electricity
from renewable sources of energy at a price set by law -
which was above the market price - and to pass on the
additional costs in a compensation system run by the
network operators and energy suppliers. This was the
case since no state aid was transferred to the companies
that produced the power either directly or indirectly
[25]. Yet, this decision does not provide a free pass for
every kind of further development of the EEG (see e.g.,
[26]). Decisive is, first, whether the financing and com-
pensation mechanism in the present EEG represents an
organization of financial streams that can be assigned
to the category of the state sphere of financing and thus
whether the act of providing state aid is present at all.d
Even then, this might not have any consequences insofar
as there is no threat of a distortion of competition or it
is at least shown to be a justified exception according
to European law, which in principle has also been
acknowledged by the European Commission with regard
to promoting the use of renewable energy ([27], p. C 74]).
The Commission, however, affirms that the EEG consti-
tutes state aid and for this reason also doubts that the
so-called green power privilege (§ 39 EEG)e and the
EEG-levy exemptions for energy-intensive companies
(§ 40 ff. EEG) conform to European law because it suspects
a distortion of competition in both cases ([27], p. C 74
et seq.]). The Commission has therefore recently initiated
a formal investigation of Germany.f With regard to the
issue of whether the EEG system of supports and com-
pensation constitutes state aid, the Commission’s legal
opinion is far from compelling because the role of the
state authorities is very limited, no state or semistate
fund is established, and the system using a levy and a
reduction in charges continues to rely on private law
for participants to assert their claims.g There are therefore
good reasons to assume that the current EEG system will
not be subject to the scope of EU rules on state aid.h Yet,
it is by no means guaranteed that the EEG system will be
found to conform to these rules. If the EEG mechanism is
found to have the character of state aid, then EU law offers
possibilities for justifying its form (e.g., Article 107 (3)
lit b TFEU) or for structuring the aid in a manner that
conforms to EU law.i To do the latter, environmental
guidelines of the European Commission [28] are employed,
which are currently being revised parallel to the legal ac-
tions [29], completely confusing the future legal situation.
The compatibility of the EEG with European rules on state
aid is essential for the further development of the EEG.
Until these difficult legal issues are clarified, which canpossibly drag on for years until there is another deci-
sion by the European Court of Justice,j the pending re-
form of the EEG must be pushed on keeping in mind
the issue of conformity to European law, not however
according to the Commission’s unauthoritative legal stance.
This means a consistent curtailment of the present volume
of the EEG-levy exemptions for the power-intensive fields
of manufacturing, restricting application of the rule to
those cases where its application would obviously result
in distortion of competition. Attention must be paid to
ensure that the selection of branches of the economy
that are given relief and the amount of the relief are in
conformity to the EU regulations on state aid. Further-
more, other examples in the EEG of preferential treatment
(e.g., the green power privilege) should be examined from
the perspective of nondiscriminatory competition in
the European single market. Both of these have already
been agreed upon in the current government’s coalition
agreement and may well point in the right direction in
terms of European law.
Maintaining a social balance
The social consequences of the energy transition policy
should always be taken into consideration, yet without
playing off social policy against energy, environmental,
and climate policy [30–32]. Those who are socially weak
must be able to keep up during the restructuring of the
energy system.k Appropriate relief from the EEG levy
can even be provided to private households, by the way,
by reform measures that are advisable in terms of energy
policy anyway. This includes making the European emis-
sions trading system more robust (see ‘Strengthening the
EU emissions trading and use the chances offered by
European inclusion’ section), which would lead to higher
prices in the electricity market and thus correspondingly
to a lower cost differential that would have to be covered
by the levy. Another effect would be the decrease in the
excessive privileges enjoyed by industry (see ‘Keeping an
eye on the social distribution of costs’ and ‘Conformity
of the EEG with European State Aid Regulations’ sections)
in the context of the EEG levy, which also could lower
the corresponding burden on private households.l Fur-
thermore, measures focused on policies to improve
energy efficiency (see ‘Urgent fields of action other than
the generation of electricity: pushing energy efficiency’
section) constitute a sensible contribution to providing
relief to lower-income groups without compromising
the goals of the energy transition [33,34].
How to continue with the German Renewable
Energy Sources Act?
The success of the present philosophy for providing sup-
port in the EEG has in the meantime reached its limits,
making a reorientation necessary. The size of the EEG
Gawel et al. Energy, Sustainability and Society 2014, 4:15 Page 4 of 9
http://www.energsustainsoc.com/content/4/1/15levy is, however, not an unqualifiedly suitable measure for
political action for it depends on numerous distorting
factors, such as the exchange price and the extent to
which levy reductions are granted (e.g., for industrial
use and for self-generated electricity) [35]. The EEG levy
does not immediately reflect the cost of the transition to
renewables to the entire economy, which also includes
any later consequences of the energy supply that are
ecological or social in nature [36]. The expert commission
conducting the monitoring process called ‘Energy of the
Future’ has made suggestions for indicators that are far
more suitable [8]. The envisaged reform of the EEG
should therefore abstain from organizing a simple limit
to the levy. A revision of the Act must not be driven by
the lack of a unit for measuring the cost of the EEG levy,
but must initiate a structural reform that is sustainable
in the medium term. Such a reform must be based on a
comprehensible analysis of the problem and a clear rank-
ing of the political goals [18]. After providing supports for
20 years, it is right to reset the priorities in the direction
of sustainable and less costly technology. In particular,
consideration should be given to the consequences the
EEG’s market incentives have on the regional distribution
of production (e.g., primarily on the windy costal locations
or rather closer to the consumption in the country’s
interior). In doing so, neither support for renewable
energy as such should be challenged nor should the
general framework for urgently required investments
be subject to all too abrupt changes.
The challenge of designing the future electricity
market
Following a reform of the EEG, thought must be given
to a new holistic design of the electricity market in the
medium term. Currently, there is no reason to undertake
any far-reaching interventions in the framework of the
electricity market that would bind us for a long term.
The current low prices on the power exchange that are
the object of complaints because they are thought to be
problematic for operators of conventional power plants
are the expression - in a manner, completely in keeping
with the market - of an excess supply of capacity for
generating electricity and of the lack of impulses from
the European emissions trading system (see ‘Support
for Renewables Still Sensible’ section) but not of the
unsuitability of the present market design. Restraint is
therefore advisable with regard to considerations of the
short-term introduction of capacity mechanisms that
are supposed to give additional income to conventional
power plants at the consumers’ expense today because
of fears that there will be bottlenecks in the future.
Although it is necessary for volatile renewable forms of
energy to be subject to scrutiny and study in order to
ensure the long-term supply in future periods, there isno acute need for political action.m The debate has turned
much too quickly to the question of how a mechanism
promoting the expansion of capacity could look in
concrete terms, even before the necessity of such an
institutional innovation has been viably justified at all.
The available time should rather be utilized to make a
thorough determination of the problems that can actually
be expected to afflict a future secure supply of power and
to prepare the design of the future electricity market
accordingly. To solve such capacity-based supply prob-
lems, the potential savings from making demand more
flexible, from expanding the network and storage, and
from the cogeneration of heat and power should be exam-
ined as a matter of principle in addition to considering a
possibly expensive realignment of the design of the electri-
city market [37]. Constant attention must be given to an
efficient organization of the various markets in order to
keep the costs of the energy transition under control in
this respect, for example, for the flexibility reserves that
will be necessary in the future [38].
Urgent fields of action other than the generation
of electricity: pushing energy efficiency
Achieving an efficient use of the available energy is, after
the expansion of renewable energy, the most important
task in the field of power supply. The pace of energy
efficiency - which until now has been inadequate - must
be forced considerably.n Estimates made by dena (The
German Energy Agency or Deutsche Energie-Agentur)
assume that the use of electricity in private households
can be decreased by up to 25% as a result of the use of
energy-efficient devices and optimized consumer behavior
[39].o The substantial potentialp for improving technical
efficiency throughout the entire electricity sector - in the
generation, transformation, and transportation - and for
saving power have to be utilized as far as this can be done in
a cost-effective manner.q This mitigates the necessity of re-
placing energy carriers and limits the necessary expansion of
renewable energy. Precisely, the power prices criticized as
being high contribute in a market-based system as an incen-
tive for investments in energy efficiency and for saving en-
ergy. The price of electricity is not a stroke of fate but a sign
of scarcity that admonishes us to adopt efficient consumer
behavior, which can effectively limit the cost burden. Active
competition in the power exchanges and a change in pro-
vider by consumers can contribute to easing the burden in a
manner in keeping with the market [15]. As a consequence,
interventions in the price of power that are motivated by so-
cial reasons or industrial policy should not be pursued [30].
Further develop grids and storages as
complementary components of energy infrastructure
Storage and networks constitute important complemen-
tary forms of infrastructure in the power sector and
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fied and entirely new tasks in the sustainable energy
supply system of tomorrow. In this way, the reserve
capacity that will be needed in the future in addition to
the renewable capacity will be reduced, and the degree
of utilization, especially of feature-dependent renewable
energy (sun, wind), will be improved. A much improved
coordination between the expansion of generation and
the network infrastructure will make a necessary contribu-
tion to this [10,11]. At the same time, another goal must
be an efficient management of the network, in which
power suppliers as a matter of principle take the needed
transportation costs in the network into account when
they make decisions about future locations [20,40]. The
optimization of the entire system (generator plants, net-
works, storage) will at the same time reduce the pressure
on generation, especially on the supports for renewable
sources. It is obvious that the EEG alone cannot bear the
responsibility for the performance and for the costs of the
difficult system transformation in the power sector.
Push the energy transition in the sectors’ heat
and transportation as well
In order to achieve the goals of the energy transition,
substantial efforts are needed in the fields of heat and
transportation in addition to the measures in the area of
power supply. Both the supply of heat from renewable
energy and the energy efficiency of buildings unjustly
take a back seat in the attention of both the public and
politicians to that given the supply of power [41–43]. In
light of the special potential for savings in those areas, it
is urgent that a coherent plan be developed as to how
measures to improve efficiency in the building stock
can be linked with the use of renewable sources for the
generation of heat [44,45]. At the same time, it is of great
importance for the acceptance of such policy measures
that questions regarding allocation, in particular, between
renters and property owners, as well as incentive problems
[46,47] be given full consideration [48,49]. Similarly, sys-
tematic incentives are to be developed in the area of trans-
portation [50]: to complement the ambitious formulation
of political goals, instruments have to be created quickly
to implement such incentives. We are unable in this
context to delve deeper into these extremely important
complementary modules in the energy transition.
Strengthen the EU emissions trading and use the
chances offered by European inclusion
The integration of Germany’s energy policy in the European
framework deserves, if nothing else, to be paid attention
to. Germany’s future energy policy has to consistently
take advantage of the chances offered by European integra-
tion. This means that a balance must be struck between
European integration and national energy transition policy.The German energy transition is appropriately integrated
in European climate policy, in the expanded use of renew-
able energy, and in energy efficiency policy until at least
2020, via the common European framework of goals [51].
Particularly from the German perspective, adhering to its
separate goals for expanding the use of renewable energy
and for improving energy efficiency can be sensible at the
European level and even beyond 2020 if this means that
externalities other than the reduction of CO2 emissions
can be addressed. This is in fact plausible [52,53] since
globally numerous environmental damages or risks, even
interregionally relevant ones, are linked to the acquisition
and use of nonrenewable energy carriers, starting with
the decomposition of the energy carriers (e.g., the con-
sumption of land by strip mining of coal), including their
use to generate electricity, heat, and power (particulate
emissions, nuclear incidents) or the problematic of import
risks that have not been priced in, up to disposal (radio-
active waste).r At the European level, interactions between
the expansion of renewable energy with the fixed volume
goal for CO2 set by the European emissions trading
scheme must definitely be taken into account in order to
avoid overendowing them with certificates in the future
[54,55].s The European emissions trading scheme - used as
an internalization lever for climate follow-up costs - is one
of the most important instruments of environmental
energy policy in the European context. It is essential
that its functioning be retained and strengthened. An
effective emissions trading system contributes to the
reduction in distortions in competition that results in a
burden on environmentally friendly renewable energy
and at the same time prevents a fall in the prices on the
power exchange [56]. Furthermore, strong European
coordination of the national measures regarding energy
policy will contribute to opening up synergies and reducing
costs. For the areas of the EU internal market and the
trans-European networks, the authority that the EU
already has should be utilized systematically. Regarding
the expansion of renewable energy, in contrast, it appears
more realistic to place one’s bets on a decentralized process
of convergence under the umbrella of EU objectives,
such as through the linkage of the national systems of
supports [51].
The role of the state in the energy transition
The preceding developments concerning energy policy
have engendered numerous misgivings with regard to
the strong role played by the state and to the regulation
of the energy sector of the economy that is increasingly
being perceived as being aloof of the markets. State
interventions are, however, indispensable where various
market failures appear in the energy sector. It is neces-
sary for corrective interventions to be taken where the
current market prices do not reflect the social truth
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consisting of power plants and networks and the corre-
sponding regulatory framework has been optimized for
the centralized generation of electricity using continuously
available energy carriers. The long-term investments that
have been made lead to the conviction that the shifting
of the system to decentralized, renewable technology whose
production is volatile does not make any business sense
even if it is desirable for the economy overall. Finally,
barriers in technology development, restrictions in the
capital markets, problems of local acceptance, and pro-
tracted approval procedures impede the necessary change-
over and cannot be overcome solely by market-based
mechanisms [10,13,57]. There are therefore good reasons
for the state to currently play a leading role in the energy
transition.
Stable framework instead of a zigzag route
The energy transition is a large-scale societal project
requiring private and public investments in the billions.
The risk involved must especially be born privately, and
the investments must point in the right direction for the
entire economy. Politics bears the responsibility for both.
We therefore need clear and unambiguous incentives as
well as a framework that is stable for the medium term
and that refrains from constantly changing the rules of
law and the conditions of investment. This will also pre-
vent investments from being depreciated post hoc that
were made in confidence in the continuance of energy
policy rules. Efforts at reform therefore always have to
take into consideration the commandment to observe
the ‘constancy of economic policy’ [58].t
Coordinating the energy transition in the federal
system
The federal system of the Federal Republic of Germany
offers great chances for innovative decentralized solutions.
The cities, regions, and states form a framework suitable
for the development of innovative solutions adapted to
decentralized forms of technology (competitive federalism).
Moreover, the guarantee of community self-management
provides the institutional basis for active local energy pol-
icies that serve as role models [59,60]. Making the energy
transition a success does not only depend on maintaining
or expanding the opportunities for decentralized decision
makingu but also on optimizing the overall system and
keeping the costs as low as possible while maintaining the
goal. The location-related consequences of renewables for
man and nature must also be considered in a comprehen-
sive manner.v To do this, we need effective and efficient
coordination of all the levels (national, state, regional, and
municipal) and space- and process-related management.
This is even the case for setting the goals for expanding
renewables that affect infrastructure planning (networksand storage) and the related costs. Currently, the goals of
the federal and state governments diverge significantly
from one another with regard to expanding renewables
[61–64]. New instruments are needed so that better
coordinated decisions can be made, such as for a federal
climate protection act [65], specialist technical planning at
the federal level [66], or a strengthening of the Federal
Spatial Planning Act.w In this way, the necessary orienta-
tion for state and regional planning decisions could be
made as a prerequisite for investors’ decisions on loca-
tions, unnecessary expansion costs could be avoided, and
local disturbances by renewables could be limited. Not
all spatial issues can be resolved, however, by central
planning. The space and freedom for making market
decisions, which are needed for achieving cost efficiency
in spatial allocations, must be maintained as a matter of
principle [63].
Conclusion: the energy transition as a sustainability
project
The German energy transition is being watched critically
around the world. It will be judged by whether and how
far it succeeds in organizing the comprehensive sustain-
ability of the energy supply in a highly industrialized
country within a reasonable period of time and in main-
taining profitability, security of supply, environmental
compatibility, and social acceptability in equal measure.
The challenges posed by the transformation of such a
complex system are considerable, and we are still at the
beginning of a long path. The difficulties that arise may
not be played down, and the task of overcoming them
requires ongoing scientific support as well as intensive
public participation [67]. In the course of the energy tran-
sition, today’s generations are investing in a sustainable
system of energy supply. The energy transition is conse-
quently an intergenerational contract. The temporally
limited (additional) costs being borne today are supposed
to lead to permanently lower costs and risks tomorrow.
This goal makes the energy transition into an outstanding
sustainability project. For this reason, it also continues to
deserve our full support.
Endnotes
aThe German Renewable Energy Sources Act (EEG)
gives priority to feeding electricity from renewable sources
into the power grid and guarantees firm rates of remuner-
ation for this electricity (feed-in tariffs). On the discussion
about the EEG, see e.g., [68,69].
bIn the following, the authors of this article also focus
their attention on the power sector since we shall pri-
marily refer to the current power-related controversies
about energy policy in Germany.
cLarge industrial consumers of electricity are required
only to pay a strongly reduced EEG levy and are thus
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http://www.energsustainsoc.com/content/4/1/15largely freed from financing the system providing sup-
port for renewables.
dAffirmative with regard to this controversy is, e.g.,
[70,71], while [72–75] is opposed (the prevailing opinion
in German professional literature), and [76] is nuanced.
eThe so-called green power privilege (§ 39 of the EEG-
Act) establishes a particularly reduced EEG-surcharge
for suppliers only if 50% of the electricity portfolio is
sourced from domestic renewable electricity. This might
discriminate between domestic and imported electricity
from renewable sources produced in similar plants.
fSee [27]. The proceedings are governed by Article 6 of
the decree on state aid proceedings (Council Regulation
(EC) No. 659/1999).
gSee only [71, p. 317]. On the continued absence of
involvement of the state sphere of financing for the
EEG-Act 2012, see also [77].
hAlso according to [72,73].
iThe determination that the support and compensation
system in the EEG had the character of state aid would
have disagreeable consequences for Germany even if a
justification according to European law were successful.
Any new aid would always have to be notified in advance
and could only be granted following approval by the
Commission (Article 108 (3) TFEU: ban on implementa-
tion). For the period of time from the introduction of the
aid until its approval, there is the threat of repayment
claims. On this, see [78] with extensive references to the
relevant verdicts of the European Court of Justice.
jAustria’s current suit against the Commission’s deci-
sion of 8.3.2011 (C 24/2009, COM (2011) 1363 final) will
presumably point the way ahead, which is over Austria’s
law on ecological electricity.
kFor more details, see [30,79].
lThe fact that aid models other than that using the
EEG’s feed-in remuneration could even increase the
burden is shown in [80].
mSee e.g., [81–83].
nSee [41,84]. In the World Energy Outlook Special Report
2013, the International Energy Agency (IEA) calls improv-
ing energy efficiency to be, of the four most important
measures for climate protection, that having the most
leverage to avoid CO2.
oWhile the theoretical potential may be estimated to be
high [85], there are markedly more restrained estimates
for the savings that can be achieved in practice; see [86].
pBy far, the greatest economic potential for savings in
the period until 2020, according to a recent study by dena,
is in the area of heat and fuels (over 16%), which is
followed by motor fuels and not inconsiderable amounts
of electricity (approximately 10%); see [42]. See also [87].
qOn this important auxiliary condition for economic
efficiency in addition to purely technical energy efficiency,
see [88].rWhile renewables also contribute to avoiding or miti-
gating these nonclimatic (environmental) externalities,
they admittedly also cause novel regional environmental
costs with respect to nature conservation, animal protec-
tion, the landscape, waters, and residential environment,
which have to be taken into consideration as a nonmon-
etary category of costs during such an expansion - see
e.g. [89].
sOn the policy mix comprising the EU emissions trading
scheme and the German EEG, see [13,90] or [91].
tSee also [9].
uSee on the legal opportunities to strengthen municipal
competencies for climate protection [65]. On the oppor-
tunities and limits of an intensified public participation in
planning processes see [67].
vSee endnote ‘r.’
wSee especially on the criticism of the marginalization
of spatial planning resulting from the strengthening of
technical planning and on the tasks of a federal spatial
planning act the analysis in [92].
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